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#2A-1/29/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6583 
DEWITT E. THOMPSON. 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
The matter before us is a request for an extension of 
time during which to file exceptions to an Administrative Law 
Judge's (ALJ) decision dismissing a charge. Section 204.12 
of the Rules of this Board provides: 
A request for extension of time within 
which to file exceptions and briefs shall 
be in writing and filed with the Board at 
least three working days before the 
expiration of the required time for filing, 
provided that the Board may extend the time 
during which to request an extension of 
time because of extraordinary 
circumstances. (emphasis supplied) 
Dewitt E. Thompson filed a charge against the United 
Federation of Teachers (UFT) on January 14, 1983. His 
Board - U-6583 -2 
_ . . , . . . . . 1/ 
cnarge was dismissed on tne merits by an AJLJ,— ' , the 
decision being served upon him on November 21, 1984. On 
December 14, Thompson made a request for an extension of 
time within which to file exceptions. As the request was 
late, it was denied by this Board's Deputy Chairman. 
Thompson now requests an extension because of extraordinary 
circumstances. 
In support of his request, Thompson alleges that his 
employer had been harrassing him at the time when he should 
have requested the extension in that it had transferred him 
from one school to another. This, he asserts, disconcerted 
him and interfered with his making the request. Thompson 
also contends that he was further disconcerted by a lack of 
support from UFT and his private attorney, and his having 
to attend a court proceeding on December 3 and 13, 1984. 
The procedure for requesting an extension of time 
within which to file exceptions is a simple one. It is 
not reasonable that the problems Thompson refers to in 
his motion papers should have prevented him from doing 
so. Moreover, instead of distracting his attention 
from his concerns as alleged in the charge herein, they 
should have focused his attention upon them. We therefore 
find that those problems are not the kind of extra-
i/lt had been dismissed once before (16 PERB ir4679 
[1983]), but we reversed that ALJ decision and remanded the 
matter for further proceedings (17 PERB 1f3065 [1984]). 
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ordinary circumstance for which his time to file exceptions 
should be extended. 
NOW. THEREFORE, the request is hereby DENIED. 
DATED: January 29, 1985 
Albany, New York 
j2ts~p*4-da^_ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ltl^ CUVL 
David C. Randies, 
#2B-1/29/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHARLOTTE VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7028 
CHARLOTTE VALLEY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
NYSUT. AFT, LOCAL 2556. 
Charging Party. 
H06AN & SARZYNSKI (John B. Hogan. Esq.. of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
BRIAN LAUD, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Charlotte Valley Central School District (District) to the 
determination of the Administrative Law Judge that it 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when it unilaterally imposed 
a requirement that all meetings of the Charlotte Valley 
Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, Local 2556 (Association) 
held on school property be open to the public. 
For at least eleven years the Association had held 
meetings in a room in the District's only school building. 
9 
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These meetings were held with the District's knowledge and 
cooperation and concerned general Association business and 
such matters as current and anticipated grievances and 
negotiation issues. These meetings were open only to 
Association members and invited guests. On August 6. 1983. 
the District's Board of Education adopted a resolution 
providing that all meetings held in its buildings must be 
open to the public, with the exception that, in the case of 
the Association, members of the District's Board of Education 
and the District's managerial personnel could be excluded. 
This resolution was adopted in the belief that it was 
required by Education Law §414. It was subsequently 
implemented by the District's Superintendent. 
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the charge to the 
extent that it alleged that the District's action violated 
§209-a.l(a), (b), and (c) of the Act. Since the Association 
filed no exceptions with us. we do not reach this aspect of 
the charge. The basic issue raised by the District's 
exceptions is whether the District violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act when it adopted and implemented the nonexclusive 
meeting requirement without first negotiating the change with 
the Association. 
We find it necessary for a proper disposition of this 
matter to consider only the District's contention in its 
exceptions that the use of a room on District property for 
s. 9499 
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the conduct of Association meetings is a nonmandatory subject 
of negotiation. We do not reach the other exceptions of the 
District.— 
We have had several cases which raised the question 
whether the use of an employer's property or facilities is a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. We have recognized that 
the rights and obligations accruing to employee organizations 
under the Taylor Law will require reasonable access to the 
employer's property and facilities under certain 
circumstances.^ 
Section 203 of the Act grants to public employees the 
right to be represented by their employee organization in 
collective negotiations over terms and conditions of 
employment and in the administration of grievances. This 
right of representation extends not only to the negotiation 
of terms and conditions of employment, but also to matters 
which aid the employee organization in the administration 
i/The District also contends: 1) The complained of 
action was taken by the District's legislative body—the 
Board of Education—which cannot violate §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act since a legislative body has no duty to negotiate under 
the Taylor law; 2) The requirement that the Association 
meetings in school buildings be open to the public is 
mandated by Education Law §414; 3) Alternatively, the 
provisions of Education Law §414, and §1 of Article VIII of 
the State Constitution prohibit use of the school building 
by the Association. 
^/city School District of the City of Albany, 6 PERB 
1P012 (1973); Orange County Community College. 9 PERB 1P068 
(1976). 
>r\ F* A 
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of grievances. We have, accordingly, acknowledged the right 
of employee organizations to negotiate provisions relating to 
access to the employer's property to aid in gathering 
information necessary for its preparation for collective 
negotiations, in the investigation of grievances and in the 
3 / 
proper administration of the bargaining agreement.— We 
have emphasized that such access provisions must be 
reasonable in scope and limited to the furtherance of the 
employee organization's representation duties. 
In recognizing this right to negotiate reasonable access 
provisions, we did not accord to employee organizations the 
right to negotiate unlimited use of the employer's property 
for all organization purposes. No such right exists by 
virtue of the duties and obligations granted to employee 
organizations by the Taylor Law. Public buildings and 
facilities are the property of the public employer, which has 
undoubted power to control their use, subject only to the 
requirements of relevant statutes and the State and Federal 
constitutions. Except for access provisions reasonably 
related to, and limited to, the organization's representation 
duties, the use of the employer's property cannot be 
considered a term or condition of employment. Thus, for 
example, we have determined that a demand for the use of a 
2/city of Albany. 6 PERB 1f30l2 (1973). 
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room on the employer's property as a union office is a 
4/ 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation.— 
In our prior decisions, we have expressed the concern 
that the employer's agreement to the use of its property for 
organizational purposes beyond reasonable access provisions 
may constitute a potential violation of §209-a.l(b) of the 
Act. We now conclude that, whether or not such a violation 
occurs or may occur, the use of the employer's property 
cannot properly be considered a term or condition of 
employment. 
The line between the right to negotiate reasonable 
access to the employer's property for representation purposes 
and the right of the employer not to have to negotiate the 
use of its property may not always be easily drawn. In some 
circumstances, it may be necessary for us to weigh the needs 
of the organization against the impact of the demand upon the 
property rights of the employer. We do not intend to disturb 
those common and well-accepted practices which have evolved 
as reasonable accommodations to the needs of employee 
1/Amherst Police Club. Inc.. 12 PERB ir3071 (1979); 
Police Association of the City of Mt. Vernon. Inc., 13 PERB 
1P071 (1980). We have also held nonmandatory the following 
demand: "The Association shall have the right to use 
college facilities and equipment, including typewriters, 
mimeographing machines, other duplicating equipment, 
calculating machines, audio visual equipment, mail, 
telephone, and computer services". Orange County Community 
College. 9 PERB 1f3068 (1976). 
. 950 
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organizations, such as the use of mail boxes and bulletin 
boards for communication with employees. Such practices 
represent minimal use of the employer's facilities and 
minimal interference with the employer's property rights. 
We, therefore, conclude that the use of a room in the 
employer's school building for regular meetings of the 
employee organization is not a term or condition of 
employment within the meaning of the Act. Such use 
constitutes a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
Accordingly, we sustain the District's exceptions and 
determine that the District did not violate §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act when it unilaterally imposed a requirement that the 
Association meetings held on school property be open to the 
public. 
Contrary to the Association's contention, the issue 
presented to us by the District's exception does not involve 
the Association's right to confidentiality in the conduct of 
its affairs. That right is entirely separate from, and 
cannot be the basis for, any claim of right to negotiate the 
use of the employer's property. The only issue with which we 
are concerned is the negotiability of the condition imposed 
by the District on the use of the school property for 
meetings of the Association. Obviously an otherwise lawful 
act of an employer, if found to be improperly motivated, may 
be enjoined by us in an appropriate improper practice 
proceeding. 
Board - U-7028 -7 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER, that the charge herein be 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 29. 198 5 
Albany, New York 
JUf7t^7&U^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
#2C-l/29/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF SALAMANCA 
Respondent, 
CASE-JMO- U-7353 
-and-
CITY OF SALAMANCA D.P.W. EMPLOYEES. 
AFSCME. COUNCIL 66. LOCAL 1304C, 
Charging Party. 
EARL C. KNIGHT. Representative for the Respondent 
JOEL M. POCH, ESQ., for the Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the City of Salamanca 
D.P.W. Employees, AFSCME. Council 66. Local 1304C (Union) 
alleging that the City of Salamanca (City) violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Taylor Law. It alleges that the 
City violated the Taylor Law by imposing discriminatory 
medical reporting requirements upon Donald Blocher. It also 
alleges that the City had improperly posted personal 
information about him on a bulletin board in order to 
retaliate against him for his exercise of protected rights by 
Board - U-7353 -2 
filing a grievance and an earlier improper practice charge.— 
The ALJ found that the City retaliated against Blocher 
for filing a grievance and an improper practice charge: by 
requiring him to submit to a physical examination by a City 
appointed doctor; by requiring him to obtain additional 
verification of his ability to work on March 6; by refusing to 
permit him to return to work after March 24; and by posting 
information regarding his dispute with the City and his 
medical condition on a bulletin board. The matter now comes 
to us on the exceptions of the City to this decision. 
In its exceptions, the City contends that the ALJ erred 
in her finding that it requested Blocher to submit to a 
physical examination in retaliation for his filing of a 
grievance and improper practice charge. It argues that its 
request could not have been occasioned by the grievance or the 
charge because, at the time it requested Blocher to submit to 
the physical examination, the grievance had been resolved and 
it had no knowledge of the improper practice charge. It 
i^The earlier charge asserts that the City violated 
the Taylor Law by disciplining and threatening Blocher for 
union activity. It had been consolidated with the instant 
case for decision by the ALJ. The charge was dismissed by 
the ALJ in her consolidated decision and no exceptions were 
taken to that part of her decision. 
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further claims that it had the right to direct Blocher to 
submit to a medical examination under the Civil Service Law, 
and that such a request was made in this instance because of 
its concern over Blocher's medical condition, his poor job 
performance, and his past abuse of sick leave. 
There is no dispute that the City has the right, under 
the Civil Service Law, to request an employee to submit to a 
physical examination, but it may not do so for the purpose of 
discouraging his exercise of rights protected by the Taylor 
2/ Law.— In order to establish such improper motivation, a 
charging party must prove that he had been engaged in 
protected activities, and that the respondent had knowledge of 
3/ 
and acted because of those activities.— If the charging 
party proves a prima facie case of improper motivation, the 
burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to establish 
that its actions were motivated by legitimate business 
4/ 
reasons.— 
It is uncontested that the City knew that Blocher had 
i-/Countv of Nassau. 16 PERB ir3006 (1983) 
1/citv of Corning. 17 PERB ir3022 (1984); Town of 
Newark Valley. 16 PERB ir4621 (1983). aff'd, 16 PERB 1P102 
(1983); City of Albany. 4 PERB 1F3056 (1971). 
1/city of Albany. 3 PERB ir309 6 (1970). aff'g 3 PERB 
^4507 (1970); Captain's Endowment Assn. (Mallory). 15 PERB 
1F3019 (1982). See also Mount Healthy City Board of 
Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
Board - U-7353 
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filed a grievance on February 10. 1984. The fact that the 
grievance had been resolved at the time Blocher was asked to 
submit to a medical examination is not dispositive of the 
question of whether this request was in retaliation for the 
initial filing of the grievance. 
The record also establishes that the City had knowledge 
of the Union's intention to file an improper practice charge 
on behalf of Blocher at the time he was asked to undergo a 
medical examination. Moreover, the City announced displeasure 
over Blocher's filing of the grievance and the Union's intent 
to file the improper practice charge. This is sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case of improper motivation. 
The City offered several business justifications for its 
actions, but we find that the evidence indicates that they are 
pretextual. 
We make this finding because the City's actions did not 
conform with its customary practice of merely requesting 
verification of illness from the employees' doctors. It 
admits that Blocher had not been cited for sick leave abuse, 
thereby casting doubt that its actions were based upon a 
legitimate concern that Blocher was abusing sick leave. There 
is also no evidence to support the City's claim that its 
actions were justified because of Blocher's poor job 
performance, since Blocher had never been warned or counselled 
for such poor job performance. 
Board - U-7353 
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Furthermore, the City offered no justification for 
requiring Blocher to obtain additional medical verification of 
his ability to work on March 6. While it claims that it 
refused to permit Blocher to return to work after March 24 
because of its concern over Blocher's health, it continued to 
deny him an opportunity to work after he had submitted a 
medical report on April 6 from his doctor indicating that he 
was able to return to work. 
Finally, the City claims that the bulletin board is used 
by the union and itself to communicate with employees, and it 
posted the information about the grievance, improper practice, 
and Blocher's medical report in accordance with this 
practice. While it may be common practice for the City to 
post information regarding grievances and improper practice 
charges, there is no record evidence that personal 
information, such as that related to Blocher's medical 
condition, is posted. We find that such posting was 
retaliatory and is therefore an improper practice. 
Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ's determination that the 
City's conduct violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the City of Salamanca: 
1. Cease and desist from discriminating 
against Donald Blocher because he has 
filed a grievance or because the Union has 
filed an improper practice charge; 
* 9569' 
U-7353 
2. Compensate Mr. Blocher for lost wages 
and use of sick and vacation leave time 
as a result of the City's imposition of 
medical reporting requirements on 
February 22 and from March 6 to June 12, 
1984, with interest at the annual rate of 
9% per annum; 
3. Compensate Mr. Blocher for any expenses, 
including travel expenses, in connection 
with the City's medical reporting 
requirements imposed on or after February 
22, 1984, with interest as noted in 
paragraph 2; 
4. Remove all postings from the 
departmental bulletin board regarding 
Blocher's medical condition; 
5. Cease and desist from interfering with, 
restraining, coercing or discriminating 
against Mr. Blocher or any unit employee 
for the exercise of rights protected by 
the Act; 
6. Sign and conspicuously post a notice in 
the form attached in all locations 
throughout the department ordinarily used 
Board - U-7353 -7 
to communicate information to unit 
employees, 
DATED: January 29, 198 5 
Albany, New York 
an. Chairman 
W^^/w^^ 
avid C. Randies J Member. ¥ 
v OOJLJL 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the City of Salamanca within the unit represented by 
City of Salamanca D.P.W. Employees, AFSCME, Council 66, Local 1304C that: 
(1) We will not discriminate against Donald Blocher because he has filed a 
grievance or because the Union has filed an improper practice charge; 
(2) We will compensate Mr. Blocher for his lost wages and use of sick and 
vacation leave time as a result of the City's imposition of medical reporting 
requirements, with interest at the annual rate of 9% per annum; 
(3) /We will compensate Mr. Blocher for any expenses, including travel expenses, 
in connection with the City's medical reporting requirements imposed on or after 
February 22, 1984, with interest as noted in paragraph 2; 
(4) We will remove all postings from the departmental bulletin board regarding 
Mr. Biocher's medical condition; 
(.5) We will not interfere with, restrain, coerce or discriminate against Mr. Blocher 
or any unit employees for the exercise of rights protected by the Act. 
CITY OF SALAMANCA 
Dated. By. 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. ^,»->a ri 
nr 9512 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 650. AFSCME. AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7625 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Charging Party. 
LIPSITZ. GREEN. FAHRINGER, ROLL. SCHULLER & JAMES. 
ESQS. (Carmine R. Putrino. Esq., of counsel), for 
Respondent 
SAMUEL F. IRACI. JR., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the City of Buffalo 
(City). It alleges that Local 650. AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Local 
650) had submitted seven nonmandatory proposals to a fact 
finder over its objections. In its answer Local 650 denied 
that any of its proposals were nonmandatory, and it requested 
particularization of the allegations that the City had ever 
objected to the negotiation of any of the demands in question. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the request 
for particularization because, in her judgment, it is 
95 
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improper for a party to submit a nonmandatory subject to a 
fact finder even if the other party had not previously 
objected. Accordingly, without inquiring into the question 
whether there had been any prior objections, she ruled on the 
merits of the seven scope issues, and she found four of the 
demands to be nonmandatory. 
The matter comes to us on Local 650's exceptions. It 
argues: (1) that it was entitled to a factual determination 
on the question whether the City had objected to the fact 
finder's consideration of the allegedly nonmandatory demands 
before those demands were submitted to the fact finder; (2) 
that it was entitled to the particularization it requested; 
and (3) that the four demands found to be nonmandatory are, 
•in fact, mandatory. 
We reverse the determination of the ALJ that it is 
improper for a party to submit a nonmandatory subject to a 
fact finder even if the other party had not previously 
objected. Inasmuch as the ALJ did not make a determination 
on this issue of fact, we remand this matter to her for 
further consideration. Accordingly, we do not reach the 
merits of Local 650's other exceptions. 
The ALJ found support for her conclusion in Village of 
Johnson City, 9 PERB 1F3040 (1976). However, that decision 
Board - U-7625 -3 
deals with compulsory arbitration and not fact-finding, and 
we merely determined that a party could object to the 
submission of a nonmandatory subject to an arbitrator even if 
it had not previously objected to the consideration of the 
demand by a fact finder.— It is therefore clear that we 
contemplated the possibility of nonmandatory subjects being 
2/ 
considered by fact finders where there is no objection.— 
The nature of the violation charged by the City is that 
Local 650 improperly insisted upon the consideration of 
nonmandatory subjects by a fact finder. The case in which we 
first held that it was improper for a party to negotiations 
to so insist is Yorktown Faculty Assn., 7 PERB 1f3030 
i/At that time fact-finding was a part of the 
statutory impasse resolution process that preceded 
compulsory arbitration. 
^The reason for permitting a party to file a charge 
complaining about the submission of a non-mandatory subject 
to an arbitrator without having made an earlier objection 
to the demand is that compulsory arbitration is not part of 
the negotiation process. Fairview Fire District. 13 PERB 
1[3102 (1980), the parties having relinguished control of 
the results of the process. 
Board - U-7625 -4 
3/ (1974).-
The public policy underlying our holding was articulated 
in Troy Uniformed Firefighters Association, 10 PERB tf3015 
(1977). In that decision, we said "parties may negotiate 
over non-mandatory subjects of negotiations and are 
encouraged to do so."(at p. 3031) The reason for this is 
that by engaging in such negotiations, the parties may 
resolve important differences between them and thus attain 
the harmonious relationships promoted by the Taylor Law. It 
is therefore inappropriate to presume that a party would, as 
a matter of course, object to the consideration of a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation. Furthermore, if the 
City notified Local 650 that it objected to further 
negotiation of several demands on the ground that 
•3-/It is significant that the factual issue before us 
in that case was whether or not the public employer had 
objected to the employee organization's request that the 
fact finder consider those demands. Finding that it had 
made such an objection, we held that the employee 
organization's action constituted improper insistence. For 
other decisions indicating that the violation consists of 
improper insistence, see City of New Rochelle, 8 PERB 1P071 
(1975) and Monroe-Woodbury Teachers Assn. , 10 PERB ir3029 
(1977). See also Roclcville Centre Principals Assn.. 12 
PERB 1P021 (1979) in which we said (at p. 3042): 
By refusing to withdraw from factfinding a 
proposal for a nonmandatory subject despite 
the demand of the other party that it do so. 
the first party violates its duty to negotiate 
in good faith. 
9S7 
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they were nonmandatory subjects of negotiation, the City 
would have given Local 650 an opportunity to withdraw or 
amend those demands, thus averting the litigation herein. 
The question whether those demands are, in fact, nonmandatory 
would become material only if Local 650 refused to avail 
itself of that opportunity. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the matter herein be, and 
it hereby is. remanded to the Administrative Law Judge for 
further consideration. 
DATED: January 29. 198 5 
Albany, New York 
ItAi/^U^i 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
#2E-1/29/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF UTICA, 
Respondent, 
-ana- CASE NO. U-? 7 31 
JOHN E. CREEDON POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
ARMOND J. FESTINE. CORPORATION COUNSEL, for Respondent 
ROCCO A. DEPERNO. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the John E. Creedon 
Police Benevolent Association (PBA) on October 5, 1984. It 
alleges that the City of Utica (City) violated §209-a.l(e) of 
the Taylor Law in that it unilaterally substituted a "5 plus 
2" work schedule (5 days on, 2 days off") for the "6 plus 2" 
work schedule that had been required by the parties' 
agreement which had expired on September 30, 1984. 
The City raised two defenses in its answer. The first 
was that §971(a) of the Unconsolidated Laws requires a "5 
plus 2" schedule. The second was "that the charging party 
has failed to avail itself of its contractual remedies as 
Board - U-7731 
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contained in the agreement ..." In its brief to the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the City presented arguments 
in support of its first defense, but not its second. 
The ALJ decided in favor of charging party. In doing 
so, he ruled that the "5 plus 2" schedule called for by 
§971(a) did not preclude the negotiation of a "6 plus 2" 
schedule as an alternative. He dismissed the alternative 
defense saying that the parties were no longer in a 
contractual relationship on the date when the new schedule 
was imposed. 
In its exceptions, the City has renewed both its 
arguments. Again it devotes most of its energies to the 
)^ §971(a) point, but it has now explained its position 
regarding the second defense. As we find that defense 
' meritorious, we need not address the City's first argument. 
The parties' agreement which was scheduled to expire on 
September 30. 1984, provided that if no new agreement had 
been executed by October 1, 1984, 
all of the terms, provisions and 
benefits of this agreement will remain 
in effect until a new agreement has 
been executed retroactive to the extent 
permitted by law to October 1. 1984. 
There was no new agreement by October 1, 1984. 
Accordingly, by reason of the extension of benefits clause 
in the old agreement, that old agreement still applies. 
) 
- 9510 
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Similar facts were presented in City of Saratoga Springs. 
18 PERB 1f3009 (1985). There we said: 
[T]he contract is still in effect. 
Section 209-a.l(e) requires maintenance 
of the status quo after expiration of 
an agreement. It is therefore 
inapplicable here, ••. [the union] 
being relegated to its remedy under the 
extended agreement. 
Here, too, PBA's charge does not allege facts that constitute 
a violation of the Taylor Law and, accordingly, it is 
relegated to its remedy under its extended agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 29. 1985 
Albany, New York 
/^^^2-^/W A&ux 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Member 
v<U 
#2F-l/29/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF STONY POINT Case No. E-1048 
Upon the Application for Designation 
of Persons as Managerial or Confidential 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (Claudia R. McKenna, 
Esq., of counsel), for Rockland County Local 844, 
CSEA 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Rockland County Local 
844 (CSEA) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) declaring Lucille 
Drof a confidential employee.— 
Lucille Drof is the Principal Account Clerk of the Town 
of Stony Point (Town). In that capacity, she maintains all 
the Town's financial records and she provides the Town 
Supervisor with all the economic information, including . 
fiscal projections, that he requires to prepare a budget. 
i^The Director also determined that Mary Jane 
Bradshaw was a confidential employee, but there were no 
exceptions to that part of his decision. 
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The Director determined that she was a confidential employee 
because of the breadth of her knowledge of the financial 
records of the Town which show, inter alia, how much money 
the Town has or will have available for employee benefits to 
be determined by negotiations. 
In support of its exceptions. CSEA argues that the 
matter is not distinguishable from East Meadow UFSD, 16 PERB 
1F3027 (1983). In that case, we sustained a decision of the 
Director finding Ruth Grimmer not to be a confidential 
employee. Grimmer was the head of East Meadow's Budgeting 
and Accounting Department and compiled the financial 
information that was used in preparing East Meadow's budget. 
CSEA alleges that Grimmer and Drof have comparable 
knowledge of the past financial situation of their respective 
employers. It further contends that, in both instances, the 
information is available to the public. Finally, it asserts 
that neither is privy to information regarding the way in 
which their respective employers plan to use the financial 
information in collective negotiations. 
In affirming the decision of the Director in East Meadow 
UFSD, we found that Grimmer merely reported her information, 
while Drof makes projections for future budgets based upon 
her information. We ruled that the information available to 
Grimmer would not make her confidential, because she was not 
involved in the extrapolation for labor relations purposes of 
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the financial data she prepared and could therefore only 
speculate as to conclusions to be drawn from that financial 
data. Drof. however, is required to make such extrapolations 
as an incident of her responsibility for preparing fiscal 
projections. The Town need not place itself in the position 
of sharing this work product of Drof's with CSEA. 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decision of the Director, 
and WE ORDER that Lucille Drof be, and she hereby is, 
designated a confidential employees of the Town of Stony 
Point. 
DATED: January 29, 1985 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randlels, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF FLORIDA. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2844 
NEW YORK STATE FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC.. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION. 
LOCAL 464A. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State Federation of 
Police, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All employees of the Village Police 
Department (including police officers, 
matrons and crossing guards). 
Excluded: Chief. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the New York State Federation 
of Police. Inc. and enter into a written agreement with such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of. grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: January 29, 1985 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
zJlJ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
) 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF RENSSELAER (HUDSON VALLEY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE), 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-2751 
HUDSON VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
NON-TEACHING PROFESSIONALS, NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
N Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Hudson Valley Community 
College Non-Teaching Professionals. NEA/NY. has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above named 
employer, in the unit described below,— as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: See Appendix A. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
•^Defined as Unit I in our decision dated January 3, 1985. 
) 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Hudson Valley Community 
College Non-Teaching Professionals, NEA/NY, and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the unit 
found appropriate, and shall negotiate collectively with such 
employee organization in the determination of. and administration 
of, grievances of such employees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition be and hereby is 
dismissed with respect to the unit of employees defined as Unit 
II in our decision dated January 2. 1985. the petitioner having 
submitted a written disclaimer of interest in the representation 
of such unit. 
DATED: January 29. 198 5 
Albany. New York 
APPENDIX A 
Assistant Director. Student Development 
Associate Director, Student Development 
Associate Director. Academic Computing 
Associate Director. Learning Resources 
Computer Programmer Analyst 
Coordinator, Alumni Affairs/Public Services 
Coordinator, Computer Operations 
Coordinator, Student Activities 
Data Base Analyst 
Assistant to the Director of Physical Plant/Energy Syst 
Manager 
Financial Aid Officer 
Scheduling Officer 
Systems Engineer 
Assistant Director Continuing Education 
Assistant Financial Aids Officer 
College Nurse 
Coordinator, Affirmative Action 
Coordinator, Opportunity Programs 
Data Communications Technicians 
Manager, Food Services 
Media Specialist 
Recruiter/Field Representative 
Assistant Director, Business Services 
Assistant Coordinator, Opportunity Programs 
Assistant for Financial Anslysis 
Assistant Scheduling Officer 
Coordinator, Technical Services 
Supervisor, Student Records 
Technical Assistants 
Admissions Counselor, Senior 
Counselor. Senior 
Counselor 
Counselor, Disabled Students 
Counselor, Veterans Affairs 
Associate Director. Physicians Assistant Program 
Coordinator of Human Resources 
APPENDIX A 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY. 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-2843 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
LOCAL 72. NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY 
EMPLOYEEES. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 72, New York State 
Thruway Employees, International Brotherhood of Teamsters has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
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parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees who comprise negotiating 
Unit T of the employees of the 
Authority and those employees retaining 
permanent status in Unit I who have 
been temporarily appointed or promoted 
to titles assigned to another 
negotiating unit. (See attached list 
for titles). 
Excluded: Part time, seasonal and short-term 
temporary employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Local 72, New York State 
Thruway Employees, International Brotherhood of Teamsters and 
enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment of the 
employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: January 29. 198 5 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
ACCOUNT CLERK 
AUDIT CLERK 
. AUTOMOTIVE BODY MECHANIC 
] BRIDGE ELECTRICIAN 
] BRIDGE OPERATOR 
\ BRIDGE PAINTER 
! Bi GE PAINTER TRAINEE I • 
f BRiDGE PAINTER TRAINEE II 
I BRIDGE PATROL OPERATOR 
i BRIDGE REPAIR ASSISTANT 
BRIDGE REPAIR ASSISTANT TRAINEE I 
BRIDGE REPAIR ASSSISTANT TRAINEE II 
BRIDGE REPAIR MECHANIC 
BRIDGE RIGGER 
BRIDGE WELDER 
BUILDING SERVICE AIDE 
--- CARP-ENTER -••-•-- -- -
CHAUFFEUR 
CLEANER 
CLERK 
CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT OPERATOR (HEAVY) 
CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT OPERATOR (LIGHT) 
CRANE AND SHOVEL OPERATOR 
DATA ENTRY MACHINE OPERATOR 
DATA ENTRY MACHINE OPERATOR TRAINEE 
DATA PROCESSING CLERK II 
DRAFTING AIDE 
DRAFTING TECHNICIAN 
DREDGE CRANE OPERATOR 
ELECTRICIAN 
i; ELECTRONIC COMPUTER OPERATOR 
:;
. EL TRONIC COMPUTER OPERATOR TRAINEE' 
ENGxNEERING TECHNICIAN 
FILE CLERK . . , 
GENERAL MECHANIC 
GROUNDS WORKER 
INFORMATION PROCESSING SPECIALIST I 
INFORMATION PROCESSING SPECIALIST II 
LABORER 
MACHINIST 
MAIL AND SUPPLY CLERK 
MAIL AND SUPPLY HELPER 
MAINTENANCE ASSISTANT 
MAINTENANCE ASSISTANT (ELECTRICIAN) 
MAINTENANCE ASSISTANT (MECHANIC) 
MAINTENANCE ASSISTANT (ROOFER AND TINSMITH) 
MARINE HELPER 
MASON AND PLASTERER 
MOTOR EQUIPMENT MECHANIC 
MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR 
OFFSET PRINTING MACHINE OPERATOR 
OFFSET PRINTING MACHINE OPERATOR TRAINEE 
'"•••PAINTER 
PAYROLL CLERK I 
PAYROLL CLERK II 
PHOTOGRAPHER II 
PLT -.R AND STEAMFITTER 
PRINCIPAL ACCOUNT CLERK 
PRINCIPAL AUDIT CLERK 
PRINCIPAL CLERK (EXCEPT THRUWAY 
OFFICE SERVICES ASSISTANT) 
PRINCIPAL MAIL AND SUPPLY CLERK 
PRINCIPAL OFFSET PRINTING MACHINE OPERATOR 
PRINCIPAL STENOGRAHER (EXCEPT SECRETARIES TO 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE THRUWAY AUTHORITY, 
GENERAL COUNSEL, DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
SERVICES, DIRECTOR OF THRUWAY FINANCE) 
RADIO DISPATCHER 
REFRIGERATION MECHANIC 
ROOFER AND TINSMITH 
SECTION CLERK ' 
SENIOR ACCOUNT CLERK 
SENIOR AUDIT CLERK . 
SENIOR CLERK 
SENIOR CLERK 
SENIOR CLERK (PURCHASE) 
- SENIOR DATA-ENTRY—MA6H-I-NE- OPERATOR^ : ----- :~ : -• 
SENIOR DRAFTING TECHNICIAN (ARCHITECTURAL) 
SENIOR DRAFTING TECHNICIAN (GENERAL) 
SENIOR ELECTRONIC COMPUTER OPERATOR " 
SENIOR ENGINEERING TECHNICIAN 
SENIOR ENGINEERING TECHNICIAN (WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL) 
SENIOR FILE CLERK 
SENIOR MAIL AND SUPPLY CLERK 
SENIOR OFFSET PRINTING MACHINE OPERATOR 
SENIOR STENOGRAPHER (EXCEPT SECRETARIES TO 
DIRECTOR OF PLANNING, THRUWAY LABOR RELATIONS 
MANAGER, PERSONNEL DIRECTOR) 
SENIOR TABULATING MACHINE OPERATOR 
SENIOR THRUWAY STOREKEEPER 
SENIOR TYPIST , 
SERVICE AREA EQUIPMENT OPERATOR 
SERVICE AREA EQUIPMENT OPERATOR TRAINEE I 
SERVICE AREA EQUIPMENT OPERATOR TRAINEE II 
SERVICE AREA MECHANIC 
SHEET METAL WORKER 
SIGN PAINTER 
SIGN SHOP WORKER 
STATISTICS CLERK 
STENOGRAPHER 
SUPERVISOR OF JANITORIAL SERVICES 
TABULATING MACHINE OPERATOR 
TABULATING MACHINE OPERATOR TRAINEE 
TELEPHONE OPERATOR ' 
TELEPHONE OPERATOR TRAINEE 
TELEPHONE OPERATOR/TYPIST 
TELEPHONE OPERATOR/TYPING TRAINEE 
TENDER CAPTAIN 
THRUWAY STOREKEEPER 
THRUWAY STORES ASSISTANT 
THRUWAY TOLL COLLECTOR 
THRUWAY TUG CAPTAIN. 
TOLL EQUIPMENT MECHANIC 
TOLL EQUIPMENT MODIFICATION SPECIALIST 
TOLL STATION SUPERVISOR 
TYPIST 
VARI-TYPE OPERATOR 
VARI-TYPE OPERATOR TRAINEE 
WELDER 
•» • <JOO_1' 
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Relations Board, hereby certify that at a regularly 
scheduled meeting of the Public Employment Relations Board, 
held on January 29, 1985 at Albany. New York, such Board, 
pursuant to the authority vested in it by Article 14 of the 
Civil Service Law, unanimously adopted the attached 
amendments to its Rules. 4 NYCRR. Chapter VII. §201.4(d) 
and (1), to become effective immediately upon filing with 
the Secretary of State. 
A notice of proposed agency action was published in the 
Register on November 7, 1984. No other prior notice of 
this action was required by statute. 
DATE: January 30. 1985 
^ H A R O L D R. NEWMAN 
Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
Public Employment Relations Board 
Text of Final Rule: 
The introductory unnumbered paragraph of subdivision 
(d) of section 201.4 of the Rules of the Public Employment Relations 
Board (4 NYCRR, Chapter VII) is hereby repealed, and in lieu thereof 
a new introductory unnumbered paragraph is hereby enacted to read as 
follows: 
(d) A declaration of authenticity, signed and sworn to 
/ before any person authorized to administer oaths,.shall be filed by 
>JMrthe petitioner or movant with the Director simultaneously with the 
L 
filing of the showing of interest or any evidence of majority status 
c 
~> for the purpose of certification without an election pursuant to sec-
tion 201.9(g)(1) of these Rules. Such declaration of authenticity 
shall contain the following: 
Paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 201.4 of 
such Rules is hereby amended to read as follows: 
(1) The name of the individual [officer or agent] 
executing the declaration, and a statement of his authority to executi 
it; if on behalf of an employee organization, his position with the 
employee organization, and a statement of his authority to execute the 
declaration on its behalf. 
Harold R. Nawman 
Chairman 
